Some instances of creative thinking require an agent to build and test hypothetical the ories. Such a reasoner needs to explore the space of not only those situations that have occurred in the past, but also those that are rationally conceivable. In this paper we present a formalism for exploring the space of conceivable situation-models for those do mains in which the knowledge is primarily probabilistic in nature. The formalism seeks to construct consistent, minimal, and desir able situation-descriptions by selecting suit able domain-attributes and dependency rela tionships from the available domain knowl edge.
Introduction
In this paper we describe a formalism for exploring the space of those situation-descriptions (also called models, scenarios, or theories) that may be consid ered rationally conceivable in a domain. This exer cise is the same as that of a controlled imagination process. Many aspects of such theory building activ ity, in the context of default logics, have been pre sented in [12] . Probabilistic knowledge derived from available databases of a domain has traditionally been used only for performing probabilistic reasoning. Our focus in this paper is to appropriately represent and use the probabilistic knowledge of a domain for per forming exploratory theory-building exercises. In the following sections we first make precise our notions for the following concepts : 1. The process of imag ination; 2. The form in which the probabilistic and qualitative domain knowledge are represented; 3. The requirements for a situation-description to qualify as an acceptable imagined scenariofcontezt; and 4. Some types of objectives that an agent may be pursuing dur ing the imagination process. We then discuss the com putational aspects of the construction of consistent, minimal and optimal scenarios by an imagining agent.
2
The Scenario-Building Process
The scenario building (or the imagination) process has been extensively examined and discussed by many philosophers and they have examined this activity in widely varying contexts such as science, literature, phi losophy, music, and painting. The scope of our for malism is limited to the imagination in the context of developing formal scientific (or other) theories.
A Philosophical Perspective
In his book The Origins of Know ledge and Imagina tion [1] Jacob Bronowski states ". . . every act of imagination is the discovery of likenesses between two things which were thought unlike". He gives the ex ample of Newton's thinking of the likeness between a thrown apple and the moon sailing in the sky. He fur ther states : . . .All act! of imagination are of that kind. . . . They take the closed system, . . . open the system up, they introduce new likenesses, whether it is Shake!peare saying, "My Mistres eyes are nothing like the Sunne" or it is Newton saying that the moon in essence is like a. thrown apple. In his view the acts of imagination in the context of scientific discovery pro ceed as follows. An initial theory exists in the form of a closed system consisting of some domain attributes and some causal dependencies that inter-connect the domain attributes. An investigation is triggered by ei ther an observation contradicting the theory or by a desire to enhance the scope of the theory by includ ing in it more attributes from the environment of the theory's domain. The investigator then needs to dis cover and include in the theory a new and satisfactory causal dependency. The task of investigator's imagi nation is to provide the candidate causal dependencies and it is the role of his critical judgment to select one dependency from among the imagined candidates. In his lecture Imagination and Science [6] J. H. Van't Hoff describes this mechanism in the words : "The so called occurring to mind results from a requisite survey of the possible case8 in one's mind and a definite 8e lection therefrom, i.e. combined efforts of imagination with the power of critical judgment are required."
The imagination process, as described above, gener ates candidate causal dependencies for building up a theory. A major source from which the investigator ob tains the candidate dependencies is the analogies and likenesses gathered by him from all the domains and theories known to him. A number of interesting sci entific theories owe their birth to such analogy based imagination process. In [4] Donald Crosby, while dis cussing the evolution of Maxwell's theory of electrical and magnetic fields, states : "A nalogie" with fluid flow, ela,tic nb6tance6, and whirling vortices had helped to bring the idea of the field into being, but once that idea had been given a firm mathematical description, the6e particular analogie" tended to drop into the back ground," and also, "Mazwell'" equation" faced back ward to Newton'" vi6ion of mechanical interaction" in a material medium and forward to belief in the con cept of the field." This analogy with the mechanics of fluid flow had helped Maxwell formulate the field theory which completely replaced the then prevalent and completely different notion of "actions at a dis tance" for explaining the effects of what we now know as electrical and magnetic fields.
In the discussions by the above quoted authors the main focus has been on incrementally correcting or extending a theory by discovering appropriate causal dependencies among the attributes of a domain. Our computational formalism follows the spirit of perform ing imagination by discovering appropriate causal de pendencies and also generalizes the above incremental notion and seeks to hypothesize all the causal depen dencies for building a hypothetical -imagined-theory.
Since we are working with probabilistic knowledge, we equate the concept of a specific theory with that of a specific probability distribution, also called a specific contezt by us. One main consideration for the formal ism is to decide on what dependencies can be extracted from probabilistic knowledge and then used as causal dependencies.
While seeking to build a hypothetical theory the imag ining agent is constrained by the need to remain consis tent with the body of observed evidence and is guided by a wish to make some preferred and desirable infer ence in the imagined theory. The intere6tingneu of an imagined scenario to the agent, therefore, is deter mined by:
A set E of constraining evenb. The occurrence of these events must be possible in the context of the hypothesized scenarios. 2. A de6ired event, d. The probability of occurrence of the event d conditioned on the occurrence of the constraining events E in the hypothesized context S, written by us as P[d I E (S)], should be very high/low (as desired by the agent).
The interestingneu criterion for focusing the imagina tion process is based on the perception that an imag ining agent is driven by the question -"what are tho6e possible contezts and scenario" in which the desired event 1d' would be very-highly/very-leu likely to oc cur?", irrespective of the probability of occurrence of the imagined contezt or 6cenario itself. Having imag ined the interesting contezts or scenarios, if the agent desires, he may take actions to alter the real envi ronment in a way to make the interesting scenarios more/less likely to occur. A scientist tries to imag ine those possible scenarios in which his experimental observations are explained and the result-proposition conjectured by him has a high probability of being true. A scenario similar to mechanical fluid flows was imagined to explain the observations in electrical and magnetic fields, and Maxwell's goal of having a set of equations as true in this imagined scenario is an ex ample of this type of imagination.
A scientist, when in an exploratory mood, may not be interested in the mo6t reasonable explanation of his ex perimental observations but may seek those, possibly less reasonable, explanations in which hi" conjecture is most likely to be true. Imagination of such scenarios would guide him towards designing those experiments and seeking those observations which would turn his imagined scenario into the most reasonable one given all the observations. This kind of imagination pro cess is a precursor to seeking relevant evidence in the larger process of creative thinking. Such imagination process can be characterized only be a theory-building paradigm and not by a paradigm for reasoning in the context of a given theory.
Abduction
Abductive inference is easily understood through the following simple example given by Peirce in (11] .
• The surprising fact, C, is observed.
• But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
• Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
Here C is the observed fact and the second sentence states the dependency relationship, possibly causal, (and available from the domain knowledge) that the presence of A explains the presence of C. In the third statement, A is an abductively inferred hypothesis. The content of the inference is the premise "If A were true, C would be a matter of course." Given a G, an A which explains the occurrence of C must be discovered by the abductive reasoner. Many A's, each explaining the C, may exist in the reasoner's mid and he would have to choose one from all the possible candidates.
The focus of many abductive reasoners [10, 13] has been on determining the most reasonable, that is, the par6imoniou6 or the mo6t probable or the lea6t cost [2, 14] Interestingneu as a preference criterion is more gen eral than the most reasonable criterion. The probabil ity of an event of interest d inferred in the context of an imagined scenario is one possible criterion of inter estingness which can not be simulated by using either the probability of occurrence of a scenario or the costs associated with the components of a scenario. Size of a scenario is another possible criterion of interesting ness.
In the following discussion the imagining abductive reasoner is given the interestingness criterion in terms of the probability of occurrence of a desired event d, conditioned on the occurrence of events in E, com puted in an imagined context S, and written as P[d I E (S)] by us. The agent's task is to build those hy pothetical contexts S in which P[d I E (S)] is very high/low irrespective of the probability of occurrence of the context S itself. The contexts and the scenar ios contained in them, however, must satisfy the con straints of consistency and should be minimal in size so as to exclude all irrelevant information. We denote by
) the set of all the known and relevant attributes for a domain. We define a &ituation-description {scenario) of a domain to be a set T of attributes, along with their values such that T C H and T is non-null. By contezt we refer to a subset of some scenarios of the domain. In the lung disease example, each individual database mentioned above represents a specialized contezt of the domain of lung diseases, and approximates the joint probability distribution only for that contezt.
One way in which a database of cases serves as a source for domain-knowledge is that we can extract from it the important inter-attribute dependencies. These de pendencies may take the form of conditional prob ability functions or the likelihood& used in Bayesian inference. Let us say that the set P contains suffi-
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cient number of conditional probability functions (de pendency relationships) derived from a database hav ing T as its set of attributes so that the pair < T, P > approximates the probability distribution re flected by the database. A different pair < T, P > for each contextual database represents the proba bility distribution approximated by its corresponding database. An example of dependencies learnt from a contextual database S is the set of probabilities P[sympt07'ni I disease; (S)]. Bayesian reasoning systems treat these likelihood dependencies as the in variants of the context S for performing probabilis tic inference. That is, the conditional probability P[symptom; I diseasei (S)J remains constant in the contextS, and is used as a dependency relation be tween the probabilities of the symptom and the disease events. The problem of compacting a joint probability distribution into the set P of important dependency re lationships has been extensively researched and some of the popular graph based representation methods have been presented in [3, 7, 8, 10 ).
Abduction with Probabilistic Knowledge
One type of abductive reasoning in a context S : < T, P > has been described in [8, 10] as follows. A set of observed attributes corresponding to attributes E1, E2, ..• E,., (contained in set E where E C T) are given. That is, the instantiations E1 = eii have been fixed by the observations. The set A = (T -E) = (At, A2 ... , Am) represents all the unobserved at tributes of the context under consideration. The ob jective of the abductive exercise is to find an assign ment for each unobserved attribute A, such that :
is maximum among all possible sets of assignments to the attributes in set A. We say that Ah. refers to that set of assignments which results in the maximum value for the above probability. the content of the abductive exercise (in a manner parallel to Peirce's formulation) can be summarized as follows :
• In context S the surprising events of the set E are observed.
• But if assignments A h were true, E would be a matter of course.
• In the context S there is no other set of assign ments for the attributes of set A which is more likely to occur along with the occurrence of the observed events contained in set E.
• Hence, there is reason to suspect that Ah is true about the observed situation.
The third statement above says that the A h selected is the most probable set of assignments, given the ob served evidence. This type of reasoning is in the spirit of inductive reasoning where we seek the most reason able hypothesis given the observed events. The imag ining agent needs to perform a more widespread explo ration directed at the most interesting scenarios and not restricted to only the most reasonable explanations of the observations.
3.1
Probabilistic Knowledge -"Imagination" Perspective
One basic way in which the imagining agent's view of the probabilistic knowledge and reasoning differs from the traditional reasoning methods is as follows. The traditional methods consider a domain's probability distribution as a unified whole within which all rea soning activity is performed. The context invariant conditional probability functions is only a way of rep resenting the complete distribution. We consider an imagining agent who possesses the probability distri bution and the causal dependency ordering of all the attributes in the distribution. The various P,'s, therefore, represent the in"Variant dependencies for different contezt8 and are useful for probabilistic inference only within their respective con texts.
Difference in Perspectives
The main difference between the imagination agent and the traditional probabilistic inference is the fol lowing:
• For traditional reasoning the only meaningful knowledge is a probability distribution < T, P > within which the instances of reasoning are per formed.
• The imagining agent considers each invariant causal dependency, learnt from a particular con text, as a basic entity of the domain knowledge.
As discussed in the section on philosophical per spective of imagination, the imagining agent feels The analogical thought as practiced by the imagin ing agent is similar to the capacity of a thinker to visualize a concept in a hypothetical context, different from the one in which it was learnt. In the context of probabilistic knowledge, the invariant dependencies characterizing a context are placed in a different hypo thetical contezt by the imagining agent to imagine the descriptions of hypothetical scenarios. This capabil ity is, arguably, the foundation of imagination process as discussed earlier, which in turn is the foundation of creativity. Theory building using defaults and default logic has been presented in [12] and in our case the causal context invariant dependencies may be seen as analogous to the defaults which may or may not be applicable in any particular situation.
When we mix and match the contextual dependencies learnt from disparate contexts to hypothesize new con texts we don't have enough information to determine the probability of occurrence of this new concocted context. This is because the marginals represented by the contextual databases are not sufficient to con struct the complete joint distribution from which the probability of occurrence of a particular context may be determined. Since our formulation of an imagin ing agent, as explained in the previous section, does not need to determine the probabilities of occurrence of various scenarios, the above shortcoming is not of much significance.
The abduction exercise that the imagining agent needs to perform can be stated as follows.
• The surprising events contained in the set E are observed.
• But if the context were to be Sh, represented by < Th , P h
> then E would be a matter of course.
• There is no other context S in which P[d I E (S)] is greater than what is obtained in the contextS".
• Hence, there is reason to suspect that S" is the most interesting context and the various scenar ios obtained from s� (by making attribute assign ments) are the most interesting scenarios.
The main difference between this abduction formula tion and the one described in section 3.0.1 can be seen in terms of the second ab.d the third statements of the abduction formulation. The imagining agent is seek ing to hypothesize that context in which interesting inferences can be made and the traditional reasoner is trying to hypothesize the most probable scenario in a given context. The computational problem of the tra ditional reasoner's abduction, as presented in [8, 10] , is to find the most suitable assignment A" in a given contextS. The corresponding problem for the imagin ing agent's abduction task is to construct the context s" by selecting an appropriate subset TIL from the set of domain attributes H and an appropriate subset P ,. from the set of all the known contextual invariant de pendencies, such that the probability of occurrence of din sk meets the interestingness criterion.
The Dependency Relation
For each contextual database of a domain, we can rep resent the joint probability distribution by the pair < T, P > where the set P may contain either all the Chow dependencies (3] , or all the Bayesian dependen cies (8, 10] , or all the qualitative dependencies known from a theoretical understanding of the domain.
We define a relation D for the complete domain, in cluding information from all its contextual databases, such that This relation has the same character as the set P of a joint probability distribution. The dif ference is that D contains all the dependencies learnt from all the contextual databases or the qualitative knowledge of the domain and it does not necessarily constitute a consistent description of a joint probabil ity distribution.
To construct the dependency relation D for the com plete domain we repeat the following with each avail able contextual database. We first order (or partial order, if sufficient knowledge is not available) the at tributes of the database in such a way that each at tribute is followed in the sequence by only those that can possibly causally infl uence it. Given this order ing of attributes, we determine the sets of Bayesian network dependencies, and the known qualitative de pendencies for the database. A union of all these sets is the contribution of this contextual database to the dependency relation D of the complete domain. The relation D therefore contains all the dependencies de rived from each available contextual database. From the perspective of traditional probabilistic reasoning D is an unnatural and meaningless medley of conditional probability functions but for the imagining agent the relation Dis the source from which to derive the candi date causal dependencies to build a hypothetical the ory. The issue of maintaining some consistency has been addressed in a later section.
For the imagining agent the elements of set D are in dependent entities in the sense that a particular de pendency can be used without worrying about the probabilistic dependence of its consequent attribute on some other attributes of the context not included in the dependency. This is because in a Bayesian de pendency a consequent node is in fact probabilistically independent given the antecedent attributes of the de pendency. Therefore, by using these dependencies the agent is not making any assumption about any prob abilistic independences. The independence among de pendencies is a characteristic of the way the Bayesian or other dependencies are constructed.
5

Structure of an Imagined Context
The task of the imagining agent is to hypothesize a contextS" such that P[d IE (S")J is in accordance with the interestingness criterion. The interestingness criterion may seek this probability value to be mini mum, maximum, or satisfy some specified constraint. The description of the context S" consists of the pair < T�., Ph >, specifying some joint probability distribu tion. It is an arbitrary, imagined distribution but must be consistent as a description of a distribution. Imag ining a contezt, therefore, is the same as construct ing a relevant, complete and consistently specified ap proximation of a probability distribution by using the known dependencies as building blocks. An analogy with building consistent theories using defaults in de fault logic [12] can be drawn here. Our context build ing task is accomplished by selecting an appropriate set of dependencies from the domain dependency re lation D. However, any arbitrary choice for the set Pk may not be an acceptable description of a context. The constraints that a hypothesized context S" must follow are the following:
1. Sufficiency : A hypothesized context < T,., Pk > is considered sufficient if all the constraining at tributes (E) and the event of interest d are in cluded in the set Th. The objective of sufficiency criterion is to ensure that in the imagined contexts the probability of occurrence for each constraining event can be computed. Only those hypothesized contexts are of interest to the imagining agent in which scenarios with non-zero probabilities for all the constraining events can be constructed.
2. Consistency : A hypothesized context is consid ered consistent if it is a complete and consistent description of a joint probability distributioneven though a completely hypothetical joint prob ability distribution.
3. Minimality : A hypothesized context is considered minimal if it contains only those at t ributes and dependencies that are needed to show the possi bility of occurrence of the constraining events and the high/low probability of the occurrence of the desired event. We consider Peirce's description of abduction again and replace in it the fact A above by a path of depen dencies, the observed event C by a pair of attributes, and the explanation A by a the path. The resulting reformulation of Peirce's example can be stated as fol lows:
• The surprising events, e, and e ; are observed to occur
• If the path of dependencies A between these two observed events were to be active in a context then e.; and e; would have occurred as a matter of course.
• Hence, there is reason to suspect that the path of causal. dependencies A is active in the situation.
The content of the above inference is the premise "If the path of dependencies A were active, the events e, and e ; would occur as a matter of course." The path A, therefore, is a possible explanation for the occurrence of the two events.
The above definition of an explanation restricts the contexts that can be hypothesized by the imagin ing agent. The agent is restricted to explain each constraining event in relation to another constrain ing event, or the event of interest. A single attribute, with a single dependency containing the attribute as its consequent node, may also be considered as a pos sible explanation of an event corresponding to the at tribute. This latter defi nition, however, results in a large number of trivial explanations in which no con straining event is connected either to another con straining event or to the desired attribute. Imposing the above more restrictive, definition of an explana-, . tion forces the imagining agent towards those imagmed contezts in which the attributes are relatively much more connected to each other. The contezb with the more liberal defi nition of an explanation are also valid from the imagination perspective but are more discon nected as hypotheses and add more complexity to the computational process of constructing the interesting contezts.
5.1.2
Contents of a Context A 111.jficiently large context Sh. is one in which the pos terior probability P[d IE (Sh.)] and the probabilities P[( e, E E) (Sh )] can be computed and it is an e �� la nation in the above described sense of the constrrumng and the desired events.
We say each element� of D has the form (z, y ) where y is the consequent attribute of d, and z is the set of antecedent attributes of d;. We define the func tions conseq(d,), antec(d;), conseq•(r), and antec•(r)
as follows:
• conseq(d,) is the attribute yin the pair (x, y ) of dt.
• antec(dt) is the set of attributes :z: in the pair (:z:, y ) of dt.
• conseq* (R), where R c;; D, is the set of attributes containing conseq( di) for each di E R, and con tains no other attributes.
• antec* (R), where R c;; D, is the set of attributes containing antec(di ) for each di E R, and contains no other attributes.
A Sufficient description of a context ts the pair < T, R > such that :
There is a path from each e, to either the attribute d or another constraining attribute e;, and there is a path from d to at least one ej.
The third and the fourth conditions stated above im ply that a hypothesized context must include depen dencies that have d and all the members of E as con sequent nodes. That is, we must include in the hy pothetical context those dependencies which can be viewed as the causes for the occurrence of d and the members of E. The fifth condition states that in a suf ficiently large context each event, in conjunction with some other event of interest has been explained. This condition would cause many nodes, other than d and the constraining events, to be included in set T.
A sufficiently large pair < T, R > selected as above would be an acceptable context only if the dependen cies in R constitute a consistent description of a joint probability distribution.
A Consistent Context
The notion of consistency of a hypothesized context is derived from the perspective of a context being the same as a probability distribution. That is, a context < T, R > is consistent only if the dependencies in R completely describe a joint probability distribution for the attributes in T. This consistency condition ensures that the resulting context is neither under-specified nor over-specified. Using the chain rule and deleting those conditioning attributes which are not a part of the dependency relationship, the joint probability dis tribution for the attributes of the set T can be written A pair < T, R > that follows the above correspondence completely and consistently describes some hypotheti cal joint probability distribution without either under or over specifying it.
For some given d and E it is possible to select a number of different subsets R from the set D such that each of these choices consistently describes a joint probability distribution. The objective of the imagining agent is to prefer those contexts in which the probability of the desired event is maximum/minimum (as desired).
The Minimal Context
A hypothesized context < T, R > is considered mini mal if the following are true :
1. Removal of any dependency r E R from the con text would disrupt a path between either attribute d and an attribute e0 E E, or between attributes e, E E and e3 E E. 2. Every t E T is included in at least one r E R.
A path is the abductively hypothesized explanation for all the consequent nodes included in the path. The above definition of minimality implies that we don't want any such dependencies in the context that are not playing a role in explaining the occurrence of ei ther the attributes d or a constraining attributes. It should, however, be noted that a contezt in the above defi ned senses of sufficiency, consistency, and minimal ity can be a set of disjoint directed acyclic graphs.
Each Bayesian Network is a directed acyclic graph [10] if we assume a direction in each dependency from the antecedent nodes to the consequent node.
With the constraints on an acceptable Context spec ified, we now examine the computational framework for constructing the contexts in which scenarios with desired probabilities values for the events of interest can be constructed.
6
Constructing Preferred Contexts
The computational task of constructing the optimal contexts is formulated by us as a state-space search guided by an admissible heuristic function. The AI search algorithm A • given in [9] has been directly em ployed in our implementation. Each 8tate is a partially constructed context < t , r > where t C T and r C R of some completely described context < T, R >. In the start state the set t contains the attribute d and all the constraining attributes contained in the set E.
To maintain the minimality and the consistency of the resulting context-description, a. dependency d E D can be added to the set r of a. state < t, r > only if the following hold :
, and
That is, only that dependency can possibly be added to a. state whose consequent node already exists in the state and there is no other dependency in the state with the same consequent node. The successor states of a search state are all those states that are obtained by adding one dependency to the parent state. It can be seen with little reasoning that each possible con text description that is consistent and minimal can be built using the above incremental step of adding one dependency at a time. Also, all context descriptions that are built using the above constrained incremental process are consistent. The minimality is guaranteed by stopping the incremental steps as soon a sufficiently large context has been created.
The goal state S for the search algorithm is that com pletely described context in which each constraining attribute e, is connected by a path to either the at tribute d or another constraining attribute e1. That is, the the sufficiency requirements for a context as discussed in section 5.1 are satisfied.
Tha A • search algorithm can yield the best, the sec ond best, etc. hypotheses until all possible hypothet ical contexts have been generated. The capability to output multiply hypothetical contexts, rank ordered according to their interestingness, is a very desirable aspect of an imagining agent. Some computational formalisms [10] can only compute the best or the best and the second best hypotheses and this would be an undesirable restriction on an imagining agent.
The next important aspect of the A • search algorithm is the heuristic function used for ordering the partially constructed contexts. If the Merit Function whose value must be maximized by the desired context is given by
then in order for the search to be admissible, we need an estimating function W(ss) such that
• u is a partially constructed context, and
• the value W(ss) � F(S) where Sis any complete conte:z;t that can be constructed by adding more dependencies to ss.
With an admissible estimating function we are guaran teed to get the optimal contezt as its first output from the A • search. Further contezts, in order of decreas ing merit value can also be obtained by continuing the search process.
For the Merit function F(S) specified above, an esti mating function W(ss) can be specified as follows:
W(ss)=(max P (d=drla,b, 
The first product term on the right hand side above represents the conditional probability values for the dependency h and the second term represents the probability computed for the antecedent attributes based on the constraining events. The right hand side of the above expression can be rewritten as :
This expression can be viewed as r where a.: 's correspond to the first terms and :c;'s to the second terms of the product. Since the sum of the probability values for all the events in a consistent context must be one, we can say that
Considering this constraint, we can say that ma:c (L a.:* :c.: ) = max( a. ).
• i ( End-Proof) The above described search process would therefore stop when a pair < T, R > has been constructed in which the probability of occurrence of the event d = dz is the maximum among all possible contezt& that can be constructed given the constraining events, desired event, and the storehouse of dependencies, the rela tion D, from which the imagining agent can select the causal dependencies.
The selected merit function is a very simple interest ingness criterion and the suggested estimating fu nc tion is also a very weak upper bound on the merit function. More intelligent estimating functions, that are stronger upper bounds on F(S) can be designed. The imagining agent can also attempt variations of the merit functions to achieve different types of objectives for the imagination exercise.
The imagining agent, thus, can produce hypothetical situation descriptions that are sufficient, consistent, and minimal fo r an imagination task. The imagined contexts need not be possible in the real world but they are only conceivable by an imagining mind. The actions that should be taken based on the imagination of a conceivable situation descriptions is the next step after the imagination task.
Conclusion
Intelligent systems have tended to use the probabilis tic knowledge of a domain fo r traditional probabilistic reasoning alone. The task of constructing the conceiv able contexts and scenarios of a domain requires that we move away from the most probable, the most likely, or the least cost fo cus of the inductive probabilistic in ference. We have presented in this paper a fo rmalism for using the probabilistic knowledge available in a do main, by methods different from those of traditional probabilistic reasoning. We have defi ned the nature of sufficient, consistent, and minimal hypothetical con texts that can be conceived by an imagining agent and have briefly outlined an AI search based computational fo rmalism for arriving at the interesting imagined hy potheses. We have presented justifications of this fo r malism fr om the perspective of an imagination process and have highlighted the differences between an imag ination formalism and a reasoning fo rmalism using the probabilistic knowledge.
